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The Remuneration Committee and Strategic Human Resource Management 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
 
Research Question/Issue: The study questions the adequacy of the agency approach 
in representing how remuneration committees design executive pay arrangements. 
 
Research Findings/ Insights: Using evidence collected from interviews conducted in 
late 2006 with 22 members of various UK remuneration committees, we find that 
concerns with legitimacy push remuneration committees towards an institutional 
isomorphism in processes and practice.  The shift in what is expected from 
remuneration committees - from mainly serving to guarantee the probity of the 
executive pay process to a recent emphasis on designing remuneration arrangements 
consistent with the strategic human resource management of the enterprise - has not 
been fully reflected in committee practice, owing to an overriding desire to seek 
legitimacy in the eyes of the shareholders and shareholder representative bodies. 
 
Theoretical/ Academic Implications: Any interpretation through an agency lens of 
the design of executive remuneration as being a key component in the toolbox of 
strategic human resource management needs to be qualified by considerations of neo-
institutionalism.  There is scope for a melding of the two approaches. 
 
Practitioner/ Policy Implications: The fulfilment of the expectations placed upon the 
remuneration committee necessitates an adequate allocation of time and resource plus 
self-awareness on the part of the committee of the inherent tendency to follow the 
norms, rules of thumb and customary practice of others.  The remuneration committee 
chair emerges as a pivotal actor, and this position merits being treated as a weighty 
and onerous appointment, possibly on a par with that of chair of the audit committee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY WORDS: agency theory; executive pay; neo-institutionalism; remuneration 
committee;  strategic human resource management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The problem of creating incentives for the top managers of an enterprise where 
ownership is widely dispersed has been recognised since the days of the joint stock 
company (Adam Smith, 1976: 264), and in more modern times gained the label of the 
problem of “separation of ownership from control” (Berle and Means, 1932: 25).  The 
dominant theoretical approach to the modern version of this problem is agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which points to the use of an appropriately designed 
reward mechanism as a way of aligning the interests of the directors with those of the 
owners (Murphy, 1999; 38).  Even in the broader high-performance human resource 
management approach (Pfeffer, 1998), the use of performance contingent pay is 
recognised as a key component. For the top management team or directors of a 
company, the difficulty of direct supervision by outside directors has long been 
accepted as creating an obvious locus for the application of such practices and the 
study of the CEO pay-performance relationship, in particular, has been an actively 
researched area (Murphy, 1999). 
Early estimates of the magnitude of this pay-performance linkage turned out to 
be empirically modest, which perplexed researchers, given the key importance of the 
relationship: “Agency theory predicts that an optimal contract will tie the agent’s 
expected utility to the principal’s wealth; therefore agency theory predicts that CEO 
compensation policies will depend on changes in shareholder wealth”  (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990: 242).  With empirical estimates pointing to the CEO gaining a mere 
$3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth, these authors concluded that 
CEO compensation was no more variable than the compensation of hourly and 
salaried employees. And the relative importance of company size in determining CEO 
led them to suggest that CEOs were paid like bureaucrats. The expanded utilisation of 
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equity-related pay in boardrooms during the 1980s and 1990s increased these 
estimated magnitudes somewhat (Hall and Liebman, 1998), and consideration of the 
risk aversion of directors lowered what might be deemed as empirically significant 
(Garen, 1994; Hall and Murphy, 2002).  Nevertheless, the results of most empirical 
studies of CEO pay left many observers dissatisfied.  In a meta-analysis of some 137 
studies of executive compensation, Tosi et al. (2000) found that changes in firm 
performance accounted for only some four per cent of the variation of CEO pay, and 
are quite critical of what they perceive to be the over-reliance on archival pay and 
performance data by studies in this area.  They argue that such data provide at best a 
very partial view of the setting of the CEO’s pay and performance arrangements. 
Alternative portraits of the executive pay process have been offered.  At its 
most robust, the managerial power approach portrays the effective capture of the 
board, whereby the compensation committee (or remuneration committee, the term 
that will be used here) becomes the puppet of the incumbent CEO, undermining any 
notion of ‘arm’s length contracting’ between the CEO and the board (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004: 61).  While producing many arresting and persuasive observations in 
support of their case, the extent to which these are systematic or even systemic 
failures remains unclear (Core et al., 2005). An alternative version of this approach, 
that avoids any assumption of explicit connivance on the part of non-executive 
directors and attempts to provide a more general perspective, builds on the effects of 
social psychology, whereby remuneration committee members unwittingly find 
themselves designing less than optimal remuneration arrangements owing to the sub-
conscious effects of the social influence and reciprocity engendered by their 
appointment to and position on the board.  Such effects are argued to impact on both 
the level (O’Reilly et al., 1998) and structure (Westphal and Zajac, 1994) of CEO pay.  
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Stakeholder theory (Mitchell et al., 1997) and stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997) 
offer approaches where the dominant self-interest of the directors is held in check, 
either by the need to balance against other interested parties or through a general 
recognition on the part of the directors of a wider responsibility.   
Gomez-Mejía et al. (2005) argue that in the face of such rival explanations 
agency theory, nevertheless, retains a measure of over all generalisability.  Bruce et al. 
(2005), in contrast, suggest that neo-institutional theory (Scott, 2001) offers an 
overarching framework in which to consider all of these perspectives.  While rejecting 
neither the agency nor the managerial power explanations, neo-institutional theory 
suggests that the way CEO pay is determined may owe much to norms and rules of 
thumb that have become established practice at any particular time and which tend to 
perpetuate through repeated use.  Whereas in agency theory the remuneration 
arrangements are seen as designed (by the remuneration committee) solely to optimise 
the connection between the directors’ interests and the interests of the owners, neo-
institutional theory views the process as being heavily circumscribed by adherence to 
customary practice that is ‘taken for granted’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 9),  and as 
paying due regard as to what other firms are doing in a form of ‘isomorphism’ 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 149).  The driving motivation is not directly to 
maximise shareholder value but, in a situation beset by issues of  bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1958), informational impactedness and opportunism (Williamson et al., 
1975), to reach for a degree of ‘legitimacy’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 340; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983: 150) in decision making. As a result, remuneration practice is 
conditioned by the environment in which the firm finds itself (industry practice, 
norms of behaviour, codes of practice, and so on), with a strong tendency towards 
imitation.   
 6 
This produces a greater isomorphism in pay practice than might otherwise be 
expected. Performance criteria are chosen less because of their linkage with the key 
success factors of corporate strategy and more because of their common acceptance 
and use within the sector. Drawing on work by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Eisenhardt (1988) presents one of the best known 
studies of the neo-institutional theory explanation of remuneration policy by 
examining the pay-performance relationship in the retail stores of a single shopping 
mall.  This classic study finds support for hypotheses regarding the design of pay that 
clearly derive from agency theory (e.g., the programmability of the job, span of 
control, outcome uncertainty) and for hypotheses that are clearly derived from 
institutional theory (e.g., the age of the store, the product mix), each making a distinct 
and significant contribution to explaining pay design. The study underscores the 
importance of both agency theory and neo-institutional theory in explaining 
remuneration policy in an enterprise. 
The current study attempts to follow the injunction of Tosi and Mejía (1989) 
and look inside the black box of the executive remuneration process by focusing on 
reported remuneration committee behaviour, rather than relying on archival data 
concerning pay and performance.  Extensive use is made of what has been a recent 
upsurge in research on the topic of remuneration committees. Because of the very 
strong institutional influence in this area, the focus is on experience and practice in a 
single country, in this case the UK. We draw on a series of interviews recently 
conducted with 22 directors who, among them, serve on the remuneration committees 
of 35 UK companies. Responses gathered during these interviews are used to evaluate 
the hypothesis that current remuneration committee practice cannot be understood 
from an agency theory perspective alone but benefits from recognition of the inertia, 
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social embeddedness and path-dependence (Scott, 2001) encountered as remuneration 
committees seek legitimacy under the prevailing regulatory, normative and cognitive 
influences that condition their actions. 
 
RISING EXPECTATIONS 
 
Remuneration committees emerged as a topic of academic research in the UK as 
recently as the early 1990s (Main,1993), although the topic of compensation 
committees has a longer research pedigree in the USA (Braiotta and Sommer, 1987; 
Harrison, 1987). While companies, of necessity, have always had a mechanism by 
which the remuneration of senior executives could be set and adjusted, the 
arrangement that is now identified with the remuneration committee did not appear in 
popular discussion in the UK until the work of the Cadbury Committee (1992) created 
the first discussion of the arrangement in policy circles, and interest has waxed and 
waned ever since – mostly reflecting subsequent governance reports: the Greenbury 
study group (1995); the Hampel Committee (1998); and the Higgs report (2003).  
Each of these further delineated the membership and procedures required of 
remuneration committees.  The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (1998, 
2003, 2006) offers a unified and up to date version of these requirements.  
The Combined Code requirements operate under the condition (for listing on 
the London Stock Market) that a company either comply with the code or explain why 
they are not so doing, the so-called ‘comply-or-explain’ approach. De-listing of the 
company’s shares by the London Stock Exchange is the only official, and as yet 
unused, sanction although institutional and media attention also seems to exert an 
informal pressure to comply. While developments in the European Union and the 
 8 
OECD may be following the UK example (Pepper, 2006), this is a very different 
approach from that in the USA with its coercive environment of the legally backed 
strictures of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 1993, 2006) and the 
mandatory conditions for listing on the NYSE (2004) or NASDAQ (2003). In 
contrast, only in terms of disclosure and the advisory vote has any statutory 
intervention been made in the UK, and this in the form of the Directors’ 
Remuneration Report Regulations (DTI, 2002), which require detailed reporting of 
directors’ remuneration at a level of detail consistent with the Combined Code. 
But what truly distinguishes the UK situation from that in the USA is the way 
that British institutional investors have been prepared to set about influencing the 
conduct (as opposed to merely the structure) of the remuneration committee. 
Institutional investors have been identified for these purposes by Charkham and 
Simpson (1999, p166) as: the Association of British Insurers (ABI); the Association 
of Investment Trust Companies (AITC); the Association of Unit Trusts and 
Investment Funds (AUITF); the Institutional Fund Managers Association (IFMA); 
and the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF).  It was the introduction of 
approved executive share option schemes under the 1984 Finance Act that led the 
institutions to exert their increasingly dominant influence on executive reward. The 
prospect of equity dilution caused the institutions (and, in particular, the ABI and the 
NAPF) to issue guidelines as to how such schemes should be administered.  
At the outset, these ‘Guidelines’ (for example, see ABI, 1987) were essentially 
concerned with regulating the uptake of share-based incentive schemes and imposing 
(initially) modest performance requirements.  The interplay of the Greenbury and 
Hampel reports and the developing ABI Guidelines has resulted in what have now 
become annual revisions of those Guidelines. From these, it can clearly be seen that, 
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step by step, the remuneration committee has been increasingly asked to take 
responsibility for ensuring that the executive reward structure is aligned with the 
overall business strategy of the company. Thus, 
 
 “Boards should demonstrate that performance based 
 remuneration arrangements are clearly aligned with business 
 strategy and objectives and are regularly reviewed. They 
 should ensure that overall arrangements are prudent, well 
 communicated, incentivise effectively and recognise 
 shareholder expectations. 
 
 It is particularly important that remuneration committees 
 should bring independent thought and scrutiny to the 
 development and review process together with an 
 understanding of the drivers of the business which contribute 
 to shareholder value.”  ABI (2005, p3) 
 
 
The advisory vote on the directors’ remuneration report at the AGM, 
introduced by the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (2002), ensures that 
the remuneration committee remains under annual pressure to deliver on these 
expectations. In recent years, commercial ratings services have been developed by 
both the ABI (as IVIS – Institutional Voting Information Service) and the National 
Association of Pension Schemes (as RREV – Research Recommendations Electronic 
Voting).  These evaluate, among other things, the Directors’ Remuneration Report 
(DRR).  In the case of IVIS, a traffic light coding is used comprising of blue, green, 
amber and red, in order of decreasing approval.  A company will speak of being ‘red-
topped’ or ‘amber topped’, reflecting the IVIS website’s representation of this grading 
of their DRR and the implied voting recommendation. 
In all of this, an important shift has taken place. Whereas remuneration 
committees were once seen merely as an arms-length administrative device to ensure 
an acceptable degree of probity in the setting of executive reward, they are now seen 
as key agents in the strategic human resource management process of choosing a 
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remuneration package and arranging that it is calibrated in a way that ensures that it 
incentivises the executive towards those decisions and actions necessary to best 
deliver the company’s chosen strategy (Baron and Kreps, 1999). The remuneration 
committee thus finds itself tasked with a prime responsibility of remedying or 
ameliorating the principal agent problem of incentive alignment for members of the 
top management team (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  It is our hypothesis that the 
current practices and procedures of remuneration committees cannot be simply 
understood from the perspective of resolving the principal-agent problem, and that the 
addition of neo-institutional theory can more fully explain current practice 
 
OBSERVED GAPS BETWEEN OUTCOMES AND EXPECTATIONS 
 
Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) observe that because much discussion of corporate 
governance has focused on rules, regulations and structures (all easily observable) it 
has overlooked the important reality of boardroom power and influence, without 
which it is difficult to comprehend boardroom dynamics and director effectiveness. 
Landmark quantitative studies of the pay performance relationship in executive 
reward, including Jensen and Murphy (1990), Hall and Liebman (1998), Conyon and 
Murphy (2000), and Hall and Murphy (2002), are all guilty of this oversight.  Recent 
interview-based studies of boardroom processes in the UK have set out to remedy this 
shortcoming. Although much of this work has addressed issues concerning the entire 
board (Pettigrew, 1992; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Stiles and Taylor, 2000; Pye, 
2002; McNulty et al., 2005; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; and Roberts et al., 2005), there 
have been a handful of studies specifically examining remuneration committees in the 
UK (Main, 1993; Conyon et al., 2000; Bender, 2003, 2004, 2007; Ogden and Watson, 
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2004; Perkins and Hendry, 2005; and Lincoln et al., 2006) and it is upon these that the 
current investigation builds.  
 
Research questions 
From a reading of this literature, four key facets of remuneration committees suggest 
themselves.  These are sketched in Figure 1.  The first concerns the remuneration 
committee business arrangements, including the frequency and duration of 
remuneration committee meetings.  As detailed above, in moving from serving simply 
as a probity mechanism to being a key player in implementing the human resource 
management function of linking pay to corporate strategy, there has been a dramatic 
ratcheting up of the expectations placed on the activities of the remuneration 
committee.  The neo-institutional prediction would be that practice in this area, while 
conforming to industry practice, will fail to allocate the time or commitment now 
merited by the task at hand, the process having assumed a taken-for-granted self-
perpetuating aspect (Zucker, 1987: 728; Greenwood et al., 2002: 62).    
The second aspect of remuneration committee operation considered involves 
the approach to calibrating the various components of remuneration.  This pertains to 
forming the key linkage between remuneration related performance metrics and the 
key success factors necessary to deliver company strategy.  While such detail would 
be expected to vary company to company, with both a wide range of metrics observed 
to be deployed and a varying use made of short term relative to long term 
remuneration devices, neo-institutional considerations suggest that in the desire for 
‘legitimacy’ remuneration committees will arrive at a convergence of metrics and an 
isomorphism in remuneration design (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 150).   
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---------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
The third area of investigation concerns the extent to which the remuneration 
committee reviews remuneration outcomes as they are unfolding.  With long term 
incentive devices paying an increasingly important role in the overall package, it 
becomes increasingly important to take into consideration the way that the already 
running long term components are developing before considering the appropriate 
award to make in any particular year (Core and Guay, 2002).  From an agency 
perspective, there is a need to constantly bring the pay-performance relationship back 
to its optimal level (Core et al., 2005).  Neo-institutional theory would predict that 
remuneration committees focus on conforming to the institutional guidance codes 
with their reporting emphasis and hence legitimacy focused on current period awards 
(Scott, 1991:169).  
The final area of investigation in this paper concerns the remuneration 
committee’s communication with stakeholders.  The nature of the dialogue with the 
company’s executives on the one hand and its institutional shareholders on the other 
reveals the extent to which the committee is prepared to ‘stand up’ to institutional 
pressures in order to secure the optimal remuneration arrangements for the executives 
and the company.  Under the ‘comply-or-explain’ approach, anything that deviates 
from the codes of practice, institutional guidelines, or current industry practice 
requires a conversation to be had with the institutions by way of explanation.  Rather 
than have such conversations, it may appear more acceptable to remuneration 
committees to seek legitimacy by simply avoiding remuneration practices that deviate 
in the least way from existing guidelines and practices, no matter what their inside 
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information regarding company circumstances might suggest to remuneration 
committee members.  
The overall research question, of course, is whether the observed practices and 
procedures of the remuneration committee are consistent with the challenge of 
delivering remuneration arrangements that effectively align remuneration (and hence 
interests) of the directors with the critical success factors necessary for the delivery of 
company strategy.  The alternative investigated here is that the appeal of legitimacy 
available through following the isomorphism of established institutional practice 
blunts such possibilities. 
 
Research Design 
In order to investigate these conjectures, a series of semi-structured interviews was 
conducted with members of remuneration committees.  Access to the remuneration 
committee members was gained by announcing the intended research project (in terms 
of its aim to probe the current remuneration committee process) at various executive 
remuneration briefing meetings held in London mid-2006.  These briefings were part 
of a regular series conducted by a major consulting firm, where the invitation list was 
wide and inclusive and not restricted to the client base (essentially being a marketing 
exercise).  Those displaying interest in participating were then followed up and 
interviewed between 22 September and 15 November 2006.  A total of 25 people 
were identified in this way, although three eventually dropped out owing to illness 
and other commitments.  A certain self-selection bias can, therefore, be expected in 
the sense that all participants are sufficiently interested in and committed to their 
remuneration committee responsibilities as to attend briefings meetings and to then go 
on to volunteer their time to discuss the process in detail with the research team. 
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The 22 participating directors serve on a total of 68 boards and on 35 of these 
they sit on the remuneration committee.  The distribution of these 35 committees by 
listing exchange category is as follows:10 (FTSE100); 10 (FTSE250); 7 (FTSE All 
Share but not FTSE350); 2 (FTSE – Fledgling); and 6 (Private). On an individual 
level, of the 22 directors there are 15 who serve as Chair of at least one of their 
remuneration committees. 
Using the FTSE industry classification, the distribution of the 35 remuneration 
committees by industry of the company is as follows: Oil & Gas 0 (0.00%); Basic 
Materials 2 (5.71%); Industrials 12 (34.29%); Consumer Goods 3 (8.57%); Health 
Care 0 (0.00%); Consumer Services 4 (11.43%); Telecommunications 1 (2.86%); 
Utilities 2 (5.71%); Financials 7 (20.00%); and Technology 4 (11.43%). This is 
clearly under-representative both in Oil & Gas and in Health Care, and 
correspondingly over-weighted elsewhere, particularly industrials. 
A semi-structured interview approach was adopted (Drever, 2003).  The 
interview pro-forma was developed around one utilised by Conyon et al. (2000), and 
was sent to each of the interviewees a week or so in advance of the actual interview.  
Owing to resistance among respondents to the notion of tape recording, a note taker 
was utilised for all interviews.  The note taker was not part of the interview team but 
circulated the transcribed note to all members following each interview.  Practice 
varies as to the use of tape recording. Bender (2003, 2004, 2007) and Ogden and 
Watson (2004) taped their interviews, while Perkins and Hendry (2005) and Lincoln 
et al. (2006) relied on note taking and subsequent transcription of these notes.  For 
those publicly listed companies on whose remuneration committees interviewees sat, 
it was also possible prior to the interview for the interviewer to read through the 
relevant Directors’ Remuneration Report for publicly available detail regarding 
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remuneration committee composition and meeting frequency.  Some of this detail is 
discussed later in Table 1. 
In addition to email communication and regular meetings of the research team, 
development of the team’s thinking on the subject was aided by a wider discussion 
our findings at three points in time. The first took place exactly half way through the 
interviews in the form of a seminar presentation given as part of  the ‘Corporate 
Governance at the LSE’ series, where the audience included a mix of academics and 
professionals from the financial sector.  The second event was a dinner held in 
February 2007 for all interview participants, where the team presented a summary of 
the findings and invited comment and discussion.  Nine of the 22 interviewees were 
able to attend this discussion dinner.  Finally, a draft version of the paper was 
circulated to all participants for comment. 
We now considering in turn each of the four facets of remuneration committee 
identified above. 
 
The remuneration committee business arrangements 
Table 1 utilises data taken from the most recently published annual reports of the 
companies on whose remuneration committees the interviewees served to reveal that 
an average of 4.8 remuneration committee meetings were held per year, not too 
different from the average number of audit committee meetings.  Respondents recall 
these meetings lasting an average of 1.5 hours, with an additional 2.8 hours on 
average required for  preparation.  Consistent with this data, interviewees did not 
report that the workload of the ordinary remuneration committee member was 
onerous.  By way of comparison, it can be noted that Windram and Song (2004) 
report that in 2000 audit committees among the UK’s largest companies were meeting 
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on average 3.3 times per year with each meeting lasting 2 hours on average and 
preparation time averaging 5 hours, although this data may understate the current 
situation as it is pre-IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) reforms and 
pre the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002). 
 
---------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
In addition to the actual frequency and duration of meetings, scheduling is a 
potentially important consideration – whether on a separate day from the Board 
meeting, coming before, or following after the Board meeting.  In all but three cases, 
committee meetings were reported to be slotted around the main Board meetings, but 
this was not generally seen as a factor that reduced the ability of the committee to get 
through the business, and was seen as being an unavoidable logistical consideration.  
The tight scheduling of committee meetings and relatively brief meetings did, 
however, lead to feelings of frustration: 
 
“The committee did not spend as much time as it should 
have done.  Wish it had been two hours not one hour.  I 
wish I’d have more time to read papers and interrogate as 
oppose to philosophical discussions.”  Director 18 (Remco 
member, FTSE All Share) 
 
 
Lincoln et al. (2006), who focused on some of the more practical aspects of 
the remuneration committee’s operation, suggest that recruitment to the remuneration 
committee is not the highest priority in the allocation of boardroom talent.  When we 
probed as to the detail of which directors sat on the remuneration committee, 
respondents indicated that membership was either a result of sharing out the 
committee workload across independent directors or a result of a company convention 
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that all independent directors sat on the committee.  While there was no sense in 
which the remuneration committee was seen as a residual claimant on the talent of the 
independent directors (e.g., second to the audit committee), membership was seen as 
requiring general skills rather than any particular expertise in human resources: 
 
“Specialist knowledge is helpful although common sense 
and judgement is most essential.” Director 13 (Remco 
Chair, FTSE100) 
 
 
That said, communication and liaison with the audit committee was recognised as 
important.  To illustrate this point, one respondent recounted how an inconsistent 
definition of earnings per share had caused problems and that this had been remedied 
by ensuring that in future there was always at least one member who also sat on the 
audit committee.  
Although the Combined Code clearly envisages the remuneration committee 
to be a body of independent directors, our interviews revealed that, in reality, most 
committees actively engage the CEO in the remuneration design and determination 
process. Indeed, the attendance of the chairman and the chief executive officer (CEO) 
was generally taken for granted, save at times when their own remuneration was 
under discussion, and the recent change in the Combined Code (2006) that permits the 
chairman to be a member of the remuneration committee was welcomed.  While an 
input from the executive was seen as essential, and allowing that in a few cases 
committees had standing arrangements for an ‘executive-free’ part of each meeting, 
the involvement of executives could be a source of conflict: 
 
“It’s more inhibited when they’re there.” Director 7 
(Remco Chair, FTSE All Share) 
 
This could be stronger, as in: 
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“We probably erred by having the CEO and chair there 
almost all of the time.” Director 6 (Remco Chair, 
FTSE100) 
 
Inhibiting or not, the input of the executives’ perspective was seen as essential, 
although the involvement of executives in the remuneration process often went 
beyond information gathering.  For some, the process of choosing the structure of the 
remuneration arrangements had distinct aspects of negotiation about it.  The 
negotiation could be incidental: 
 
“For the direct reports of the CEO, he must have some say, 
although it does tend to set the framework for his own 
expectations.” Director 9 (Remco Chair, FTSE250) 
 
Or tacit: 
 
“He claimed he wanted the team to benefit but, when it got 
down to it, he was the only one in the team.” Director 10 
(Remco member, Private) 
 
Or plain explicit: 
 
“Life is one long negotiation with our chief executive. We 
have a thrusting, dynamic young man who has thrusting, 
dynamic ideas of remuneration.”  Director 5 (Remco 
member, FSTE250) 
 
 
But it is generally accepted that to set appropriate incentives it is necessary to have a 
sense for what will work, and in this respect the view of the CEO was essential in 
determining whether a particular design was one which promoted the desired 
behaviour on the part of the executives: 
 
“It’s quite normal for the chief executive to say ‘I feel 
strongly that X should be in there’.  As a remco member I 
was quite keen on this enthusiasm, getting their buy-in.” 
Director 18 (Remco member, FTSE All Share) 
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One finding of our research that appears to have previously been overlooked is 
the key role played by the chairman of the remuneration committee.  In establishing 
the appropriate relationship on remuneration with the senior executives, the 
remuneration committee chair was seen to be the key player:  
 
 “In one situation, the chair of a remuneration committee 
looks to me… ‘When we’ve taken a decision, we have 
taken a decision and do not accept pushback’.  The strength 
of the remuneration committee chairman is important.  As 
long as you are within the parameters of the benchmarking 
and company policy (e.g. median) most chairs of 
remuneration committees are quite tough. You need to have 
been around a bit to be chairman of a remuneration 
committee.” Director 21 (Remco Chair, FTSE100) 
 
 
The chair of the remuneration committee also plays a major role in dealing with the 
various constituencies – both in terms of ‘negotiating’ with the senior management 
and in terms of liaising with the remuneration consultants and the internal human 
resources/ compensation and benefits staff function in the company.  This makes the 
remuneration committee chairman’s role a relatively onerous one, both in terms of 
time and also in shaping the agenda and key proposals put before the committee. As 
one remuneration committee chair noted in terms of managing the flow of information 
to the committee: 
 
“It’s important to come with not necessarily a fully-baked 
cake but you need to know if it’s a fruitcake or a sponge 
cake and of what shape.” Director 22 (Remco Chair, 
FTSE250) 
 
 
The committee members we interviewed invariably made reference to the part 
consultants play in the process, both in provision of information (e.g., market data) 
and in putting forward ideas on design.  However, remuneration committee chairs, in 
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particular, also suggested that the HR director (or top reward specialist) also played a 
vital role in supporting the process.  
The important dimensions emerging above are that the remuneration 
committee is seen as a generalist committee.  With the exception of the chair, its 
meetings are not felt by members to be particularly time consuming, although there is 
a sense in which longer meetings might prove useful  The committee finds itself 
negotiating (implicitly or explicitly) with the executive team regarding the shape and 
size of their remuneration packages and having the CEO in attendance for much of the 
time is felt inhibiting.  In all of this, the chair of the committee is seen to play a key 
role.  There is some evidence here of a path dependence or inertia (Powell, 1991), 
whereby current committee business arrangements have failed to move beyond an 
emphasis on probity to reflect the more demanding task of designing the remuneration 
arrangements required by agency and strategic human resource management 
considerations.  
Having discussed our findings on the business arrangements of the 
remuneration committees and how they operate, we now turn to examine the detail of 
remuneration design. 
 
Calibrating the components of remuneration 
When it comes to choosing the pay elements and the strength of their links to 
performance, interviewees recorded a range of opinion, with no small number being 
quite simply sceptical of the efficacy of the process.  This ranges from those who do 
not regard executives as being driven by such extrinsic rewards (Fehr and List, 2004): 
 
“This motivational business is “phooey”.  People do the 
best job they can.  Our LTI is based on the  total 
shareholder return of a comparator group. You’ve no idea 
 21 
until the end of the three years what the outcome will be. 
So what can you do?  People just do their best.” Director 19 
(Remco Chair, FTSE250) 
 
to those who while suspecting that the process is incapable of being designed properly 
to motivate believe it should at least take care not to de-motivate and, in particular, 
should ensure in a defensible level of payout: 
 
“One wonders at the end of the day if it motivates but you 
have to make sure that it doesn’t de-motivate. The company 
itself should be protected – paying sensible figures for 
sensible results.”  Director 14 (Remco member, FTSE100) 
 
 
A driving consideration in choosing the remuneration package was how it 
would appear to institutional shareholders and other outsiders (Bender, 2004), as the 
following views from three different executives make clear: 
 
“We look at the maxing-out amounts.  This is what you 
have to do for the institutions.”  Director 13 (Remco Chair, 
FTSE100) 
 
“How is this going to look in the annual report when the 
institutions crawl over it?” Director 9 (Remco Chair, 
FTSE250) 
 
“..we have the whole mechanism for not rewarding failure 
rather than seeking to get a genuine incentive.”  Director 1 
(Remco Chair, FTSE250) 
 
 
In their interviews of board committee members, Spira and Bender (2004) 
bring out clearly this source of tension, earlier identified by Tricker (1984) and by 
Hilmer (1993), that exists within the remuneration committee between ‘Performance’ 
on the one hand (achieving an effective agency theory type pay mechanism, thereby 
strategically aligning incentives) and  ‘Conformance’ on the other. With 
‘Conformance’ the emphasis is very much on being able to demonstrate in an ex-post 
sense that pay awards conform with the various governance codes reviewed above,  
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i.e., a monitoring function. In the pursuit of conformance, the remuneration committee 
is mainly concerned with probity and legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1981).  Performance considerations, on the other hand, are more 
managerial and entail the remuneration committee actively designing remuneration 
arrangements that both connect with the external reality of the executive labour 
market (in paying the going rate) and address the agency problem by aligning the 
interests of the executives with the achievement of the key success factors that 
underpin corporate strategy (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
In terms of performance, the remuneration committee plays a key role in the 
strategic human resource management of the company by crafting remuneration 
arrangements that attempt to link the interests of the top management team with 
attainment of the key success factors for corporate strategic success (Stredwick, 
2000). From the quotations above, there is obviously a clear tension between the 
performance role and the conformance role. This finding echoes that of Ogden and 
Watson (2004, 2006) who, in a series of interviews with remuneration committees of 
water companies, concluded that these remuneration committees felt highly 
constrained by political considerations. Such pressures are seen to result in DiMaggio 
and Powell’s (1983) isomorphism in organizational practice, whereby the desire to 
shape remuneration design in a similar manner to other comparable companies 
dominates detailed considerations of performance effects. 
In our interviews, evidence of a similar desire to conform also emerged when 
remuneration committee members attempted to explain the relative prevalence of 
growth in earnings per share (eps) and total shareholder return (tsr) as performance 
metrics in long term incentive (LTI) awards.  The requirement to satisfy outside 
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commentators rather than any linkage to corporate strategy was usually proffered as a 
justification.  From three interviews: 
 
“[We] used eps due to the lack of anything else we could 
think was acceptable.  We knew the market would be 
comfortable with eps and we were unsure as to which one 
[metric] we should be using.” Director 14 (Remco member, 
FTSE100) 
 
“The obvious metrics of eps and tsr are catch-alls but it’s 
where you always end up.” Director 9 (Remco Chair, 
FTSE250) 
 
“Normally I am happy to put my head over the parapet but 
not in remuneration.  I would be slightly cautious as I don’t 
want to be castrated by the ABI.”  Director 22 (Remco 
Chair, FTSE250) 
 
 
Some remuneration committee members expressed a frustration at the lack of 
depth of analysis in the contribution made by their committee to the design of the 
remuneration package, with a resulting lack of confidence in the result: 
 
“I’m doubtful how incentivising the package is.  I think at 
least once a year we ought to have a fairly open-ended 
discussion and not too strictly bound by time.  I feel the 
need to have a more strategic meeting:  What are we trying 
to achieve?  Is the system too complicated?  Is it alright?” 
Director 4 (Remco member, FTSE250) 
 
Whereas most were satisfied that the performance metrics chosen to operate on the 
short term incentive (STI - annual bonus) spoke directly to the company’s strategic 
requirements, there was considerable unease with regard to the long term incentive 
(LTI).  Thus: 
 
“Everyone understands the short-term plan but long-term is 
an area where executives don’t understand the reward.” 
Director 1 (Remco Chair, FTSE250) 
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“I have often found it difficult to see how management 
conduct and performance has been affected/influenced by 
LTI.” Director 18 (Remco member, FTSE All Share) 
 
 
This sharp break between STI and LTI can be seen in Table 2.  The 
performance metrics utilised in the companies where the interviewees sat on the 
remuneration committee reveal a much richer range in STI (annual bonus) than in LTI 
(share options and performance shares). 
 
---------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
In their study of remuneration committees, Perkins and Hendry (2005) made 
an explicit attempt to examine the extent to which remuneration committees really 
adhere to the agency theory vision of designing a remuneration package that provides 
incentives calibrated in the light both of what labour market forces indicate and what 
corporate strategy requires.  An important conclusion of their work is the recognition 
of the wide range of discretion afforded the remuneration committee in its 
deliberations (“space for interpretation”, p1446) and that “what matters is how 
rewards appear, not whether performance is being objectively over-valued” (p1464). 
The result is that “Ordering top pay may then prove to be contingent more on 
‘communication’ than performance management considerations.” (p1464) whereby an 
isomorphism in practice emerges as a result of a 'socially negotiated consensus' 
(Greenwood et al., 2002: 59). Again, the dimension of conformance dominates 
performance considerations and this is confirmed in our findings in terms of LTI 
design. 
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But, as in the findings discussed above, remuneration committee members also 
expressed frustration at the difficulty they confronted in ‘validating’ (Perkins and 
Hendry, 2005, p1457) the pay-performance relationship set in place, e.g., in terms of 
the appropriateness or of the line of sight of the chosen comparator companies in long 
term plans. This we refer to this as the calibration process and, in a world of fast 
changing and noisy data, it presents the committee with a serious challenge, but one 
that must be confronted if it is to live up to the ‘performance’ expectation now placed 
upon it. 
Consistent with the findings of Perkins and Hendry (2005) and Bender (2003, 
2004, 2007), who conclude that the agency theory perspective provides a distorted 
vision of what actually occurs in remuneration committees and boardrooms, the 
findings above point to the empirical impact of wider social processes on the 
decisions of the remuneration committee producing and isomorphism in practice 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1981; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996), undermining the view 
that remuneration packages are precisely calibrated to reflect labour market 
conditions.   
Of course the main rival explanation to any isomorphism in organizational 
practice is social learning (Westphal et al., 2001) which can be observationally 
equivalent.  An eloquent expression of this arose in one of our interviews: 
 
“My view is ‘follow with pride’.  You need to keep 
standards up re: techniques and ways of reporting.  
Copying ideas from other companies is a good thing if they 
are appropriate.  Actively looking outside to see what 
developments there are.  If there’s been a major issue 
elsewhere then pause for thought …. Why did that happen?  
Could it happen to us?”  Director 17 (Remco Chair, 
FSTE100) 
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While social learning may play a part in the story, the bulk of the evidence presented 
above calls into question the extent to which remuneration arrangements are designed 
to attune the interest of the executives to delivering corporate success.  The following 
subsection extends this line of analysis by probing as to the extent to which 
remuneration committees re-visit earlier decisions in the context of recent experience 
and their current strategy agenda – the confirming of the remuneration design. 
 
Review of remuneration outcomes 
Given the lack of confidence generally expressed regarding the effectiveness of the 
design process, particularly in terms of the LTI, it is all the more surprising how little 
account our respondents took of the extant grants of long term incentives held by the 
executives in the form of deferred bonus arrangements, unvested share options, active 
performance share plans and so on.  Any judgement regarding the precision of the 
alignment of interests between the top management team and the attainment of 
corporate strategy must rest, to no small extent, on whether previous incentive grants 
are currently ‘live’ in the sense of being likely to pay out, and the impact that they are 
having on current executive behaviours. Core et al. (2005. p1169) label this 
distinction between the annual award and the total situation of the executive as one 
between ‘Pay Incentives’ and ‘Portfolio Incentives’.   
For short term incentives, monthly information arising out of the regular 
budget monitoring process was often used to keep sight of likely annual bonus 
outcomes.  However, it was extremely rare to find much effort being made in the 
remuneration committee to review the long term incentives faced by an executive and, 
in many cases, surprisingly little was done to apprise executives of how they were 
faring in terms of likely payout of earlier issues of Long Term Incentives (LTIs).  
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Prior to 2002, it was common to find both retesting of performance targets and 
payouts on performance share plans for below median performance but, owing to 
institutional pressure (manifested, for example, in the ABI Guidelines, at that time), 
these features are now largely absent.  As a result, the long term incentive has become 
a much more fragile vehicle for delivering performance–related remuneration.  This 
makes the failure to monitor and revisit past long term incentive grants all the more 
surprising, particularly when coupled with a recognition that the LTI is often not well 
understood – neither by the recipients nor by the remuneration committees: 
 
“.. executives could not see what they had to do to impact 
on reward.” Director 6 (Remco Chair, FTSE100) 
 
“They never know from one month to the next if they are in 
the money or out of the money.  There’s no line of sight”. 
Director 10 (Remco member) 
 
Although there are, as usual, exceptions to this situation: 
 
“We produce a valuation once a year and we write a note 
saying ‘you can’t rely on this but this is what’s happening 
at the moment’ ”. Director 19 (Remco Chair, FTSE250) 
 
Of course, bounded rationality and imperfect information ensure that 
outcomes may not be at all as expected - due to the particular choice of comparator 
groups, performance metrics, or performance targets - a situation that is always 
vulnerable to unanticipated changes in the company’s environment. The evidence 
from our interviews suggests that with STI the problem is less likely to arise, owing to 
more accurate calibration with precisely tailored metrics with (and a one year horizon, 
as opposed to at least three years with LTI).   
A key question is whether, mindful of the participation constraint, the 
remuneration committee is ever prepared to exercise discretion in adjusting the payout 
or the design of the incentive schemes. The participation constraint arises from the 
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need to ensure that, whatever the incentive aspects of the remuneration arrangements, 
executives must see an expected reward that is at least as high as is available in 
alternative employment, otherwise they will not continue to participate in the offered 
contract (Gibbons, 2005). Bender (2007) presents detailed evidence of the 
circumstances under which companies re-design their incentive schemes, generally to 
better effect a pay out.  In many ways, this reluctance to exercise discretion is an 
unavoidable consequence of the fact that shareholder approval has been sought for the 
design of share-based LTI schemes, and with boardroom executives usually operating 
at the maximum limits permitted under such schemes there is actually little scope for 
discretion.  A shareholder vote is then required to change the long term incentive plan.  
In any case, discretion is something that the remuneration committee member wishes 
to avoid. 
 
“We’d like to use discretion as little as possible.” Director 1 
(Remco Chair, FTSE250) 
 
“Rules are rules.”  Director 6 (Remco Chair, FTSE100) 
 
“It’s silly to design a plan and get it approved by 
shareholders and then go back next year regarding 
changes.” Director 2 (Remco Chair, FTSE All Share) 
 
 
When the LTI scheme is seen to fail then the general reaction is to hold a review and 
re-design the scheme (Bender, 2007) or, in much rarer cases: 
 
“Change the people rather than change incentives.  
Incentives only work so far”.  Director 14 (Remco member, 
FTSE100) 
 
 
Lincoln et al. (2006) also highlight the attention (in both time allocated and 
effort expended) given by remuneration committees to the pay for performance 
relationship. It requires detailed scrutiny (and re-scrutiny) of the performance of the 
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company and the performance of the executives. Rather than probe deeply on this 
issue, it is easy for a remuneration committee to fall back on an isomorphism of 
organisational practice (DiMaggio  and Powell, 1991: 9) and do what everyone else is 
doing – for example, by setting relative tsr targets for the vesting of options or 
performance shares, by deferring STI bonus payments into unvested equity, and so on. 
While the award of any package may be tested against ‘overpayment’ to minimise the 
risk of incurring Bebchuk and Fried’s (2004: 64) “outrage costs”, the time and 
resource may not be available to allow a rigorous investigation by the remuneration 
committee of just which performance targets best ‘fit’ the company’s overall 
corporate strategy or reflect the current status of the existing tranches of options, 
performance shares, unvested bonus payments and accrued pension entitlement 
already awarded to the executive in question.  
The willingness on the part of the remuneration committee to confirm the 
efficacy of the chosen reward mechanisms is of critical importance in the dynamics of 
executive reward. This conscious movement back to the optimum pay-performance 
sensitivity lies at the heart of agency theory and is, according to Core and Larcker 
(2002), the only generally available insight into the causal connection between pay 
and performance. Key to this view is the notion that companies regularly confirm that 
the reward mechanisms in place are performing as required.  The evidence discussed 
above suggests that, rather than taking a portfolio view of executive reward, 
remuneration committees are primarily concerned with maintaining their legitimacy 
through conforming with regulatory guidelines in terms of current awards.  The 
outcomes of earlier (long term) awards are seldom reported in cash terms, and 
attention, therefore, focuses on the current year awards.  And, as in Ocasio’s (1997: 
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190) “situated attention”, it is the current year award that is the object of the 
remuneration committee’s attention.  
One further factor that both inhibits the confirmation of the efficacy of the 
remuneration design and inhibits the adjustment of the design of subsequent awards in 
the light of that information is the need to communicate with shareholders.  It is to this 
final aspect in the roundel of remuneration committee activity that we now turn. 
 
Communicating with stakeholders 
In terms of communication with the central stakeholders in this matter – namely, the 
shareholders and the executives –  a mixed picture emerges.  There was a generally 
robust attitude displayed by most respondents towards communicating with 
shareholders.  This may reflect the fact that, having made every effort to conform, 
there was little to fear from institutional criticism.  Specifically, in terms of the ABI: 
 
“I go and talk to them and they turn out to be pretty 
sensible.” Director 6 (Remco Chair, FTSE100) 
 
That said, most of those who do contact their shareholders or institutional 
representatives such as the ABI are generally prepared to make concessions: 
 
“.. gave in to the ABI too easily last time.” Director 5 
(Remco member, FSTE250) 
 
“We were prepared to concede a higher target.  We had 
further concessions in the locker that we didn’t have to 
give.” Director 13 (Remco Chair, FTSE100) 
 
 
Much rarer (unique in our study) are those prepared to endure the sanction of 
a poor rating from the ABI: 
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“If you don’t get a certain number of amber tops then you 
are not looking after the people!” Director 1 (Remco Chair, 
FTSE250) 
 
If anything, it is in communication with the executive team where the remuneration 
committee experiences most tensions: 
 
 “A triangular relationship with the company chairman is 
the best structure - including the remuneration committee 
and outside advisers.  The relationship between the 
remuneration committee chairman and the chief executive 
and executive team (business objectives, decision to be 
median or upper quartile payers, …...).  Lack of 
engagement between remuneration committee chair and 
executives is a big problem if it occurs.  That’s where the 
delicate balance is.” Director 22 (Remco Chair, FTSE250) 
 
“I get a sense that directors are becoming rather irritated by 
being boxed in.  They want us to go and see the ABI etc., 
tell them what we’re doing and put up with the flack.” 
Director 23 (Remco member, FTSE250) 
 
“Executives, the ABI, shareholders: there’s no alignment of 
interest.  Standing back now after 10 years as a remco 
chairman – you’re lashed to different sets of horses and 
being pulled apart.”  Director 25 (Remco member, FTSE 
All Share) 
 
This situation is illustrated in Figure 2 and probably represents the major tension in 
the remuneration committee.  From the evidence above and that of Bender and Spira 
(2004) and Bender (2003, 2004, 2007) it is the dialogue outside of the company that 
currently influences most remuneration committee behaviour. 
 
---------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
These tensions can be a manifestation of the remuneration committee doing a 
good job, by designing remuneration arrangements that are both effective and 
challenging.  But they can also be a sign that owing to external pressures an incentive 
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scheme is imposed that does not offer an effective line of sight between reward and 
achievement of the critical success factors of the company’s business strategy.  The 
attendance of the CEO during much of the deliberation period was noted above.  This,  
combined with the knowledge that the award package will have to be communicated 
to institutional shareholders, may simply incline the remuneration committee to rely 
on the defensible and legitimising practice of doing what everyone else is doing – ‘the 
practices and procedures defined by prevailing rationalized concepts ..’ (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977: 340).  But this may not, of course, be what is best suited to any one 
particular company. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
Changes in the UK corporate governance environment since Cadbury (1992) have led 
to increased expectations regarding how remuneration committees should operate.  
Some of these expectations refer to committee structure and have, more or less, been 
widely adopted (MacNeil and Li, 2006).  Other expectations refer more to the conduct 
and objectives of the remuneration committee, and represent a serious demand on its 
capacity.  Institutional investors, and the ABI (2005) in particular, have made it clear 
that they expect the remuneration committee to design and implement reward 
mechanisms in a such a way as to align the interests of the executives with the 
attainment of the key success factors necessary for the effective execution of overall 
corporate strategy. This strategic human resource management task (Baron and Kreps, 
1999) represents a material change in scope from the traditional remuneration 
committee role of guaranteeing the probity of the executive pay process. Agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) has become the dominant paradigm for theorising 
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about the executive pay process in this context. It suggests a pay-for-performance 
reward mechanism as providing a possible answer to the problems of bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1947), opportunism and information impactedness (Williamson et 
al., 1975) that beset the effective management of the executive directors.  
 Agency theory has long been accepted as a useful perspective in the study of 
organisations (Eisenhardt, 1989), and the setting of executive pay arrangements is an 
obvious locus for the deployment of such a perspective (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), 
but the disappointing explanatory power of agency theory in this area, as manifested 
in many empirical studies of the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO pay (Murphy, 
1999; Tosi et al., 2000) suggests that agency theory alone is not capable of fully 
capturing events. Focusing on the design and operation of the contract can cause 
researchers to overlook important organisational considerations regarding both the 
context in which the remuneration arrangements are drawn up and the situation of the 
remuneration committee itself, as counterparty to the contract. The remuneration 
committee is not an independent ‘black box’ from which emerges an optimal structure 
of performance metrics and reward arrangements (Core and Guay, 1999). As with the 
board itself, it is a social entity.  It is necessary, therefore, to recognise the 
remuneration committee’s cognitive limitations in the face of finite information, 
bounded computational capacity and restricted time constraints.    
 Neo-institutionalist analysis of the situation (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; and Scott, 2001) suggests that the actual arrangements 
may be path dependent and driven by efforts to attain legitimacy, both by mimicking 
the arrangements of others and by adhering to perceived regulatory norms.  These are 
different forces from the optimisation calculus underpinning agency theory (Garen, 
1994; Core and Guay, 1999; Hall and Murphy, 2002; Gibbons, 2005).  Any coercive, 
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mimetic or normative processes that condition the behaviour of the remuneration 
committee are likely to  inhibit the attainment of the consistency and alignment in the 
available CEO pay incentive levers (the annual bonus plans, share options, 
performance share plans, deferred bonus arrangements, and so on) that is demanded 
by strategic human resource management (Baron and Kreps, 1999).  In the present 
study, this is most clearly seen in the manner in which in an isomorphism of practice 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) is observed in the design of long term incentives (share 
options and performance share plans) which draw on a  markedly more limited 
repertoire of performance metrics than do the less widely scrutinised or codified short 
term incentives (annual bonus). 
 The evidence produced in this paper points to an improved understanding of 
executive remuneration outcomes being available through focusing not only on the 
CEO or executives who are in receipt of the remuneration but also on the counter-
party to these remuneration arrangements – namely, the remuneration committee.  
This interview based study of remuneration committee members adds to the mounting 
evidence produced by Conyon et al. (2000), Bender (2003,2004,2007), Ogden and 
Watson (2004), Perkins and Hendry (2005) and Lincoln et al. (2006), all suggesting 
that the dominant paradigm of agency theory may not be capable on its own of fully 
explaining the observed remuneration arrangements for a company’s top executives.  
The argument presented here suggests developing theory so as to set agency theory 
within a neo-institutional framework.  We have pointed to four distinct areas of the 
remuneration committee’s activities where such interaction is visible, namely in the 
committee’s business arrangements, its efforts to calibrate remuneration with key 
success factors, the failure to keep the portfolio of remuneration in view, and the 
tensions raised in communication with stakeholders.  In each of these, evidence was 
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presented to suggest that remuneration committee decisions are socially embedded, 
and the consequence of customary practice and path-dependence (Scott, 2001). 
Committees seek legitimacy for their decisions by recourse to norms and rules of 
thumb, resulting in an isomorphism of organisational practice that blunts the agency 
theory based application of performance contingent remuneration so commonly 
assumed to hold (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1981). 
We find that the business arrangements of a successful remuneration 
committee depend on more than simply drafting a requisite number of independent 
directors as members and scheduling some brief meetings.  There is a requirement for 
a significant commitment of committee time and the remuneration committee chair, in 
particular,  plays a key role in managing and coordinating the committee, the top 
management team, the external advisors and the internal human resources staff to 
achieve an acceptable outcome for all stakeholders.  This role has probably been 
underestimated and undervalued to date, as practices continue to reflect a time when 
the main function of the committee was to ensure the probity of the pay process. 
There was relatively little emphasis on focusing the remuneration committee 
on reward outcomes built up over years through a succession of base salary, bonus, 
long term incentive and pension policies.  Each year’s reward tended to be treated on 
its own as a separate event, rather than as the opportunity to ‘rebalance’ the 
executive’s ‘reward portfolio’ in the light of recent developments (Core and Guay, 
2002).  To an extent, this was due to rigidities inherent in having to seek shareholder 
approval for changes in the LTI, but it was also due to a reluctance to revisit past 
designs and recalibrate them to reflect current realities.  Even in the absence of this 
consideration, the remuneration committee’s calibration of each year’s pay award was 
seen in the area of LTI to rely on a limited range of very similar performance metrics.  
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These findings point to a propensity on the part of remuneration committees to follow 
an isomorphism of practice; the aim of this ‘ritual conformity’ (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977: 361) being to gain legitimacy for the committee’s actions. 
Communication with shareholders and institutions such as the ABI tended to 
be of more concern to remuneration committees than communication with the top 
management team.  This emphasis on ‘conformance’ over performance (Tricker, 
1984; Hilmer, 1993; Spira and Bender, 2004) leads to tensions with senior 
management, with whom effective communication is often overlooked as attention 
focuses on the outside stakeholders.  
 Eisenhardt (1989) emphasised that case based studies always have the 
limitation of being vulnerable to excessively narrow and idiosyncratic development of 
theory. One source of possible bias in this study is in the sample selection, which 
relied on volunteer participants – such remuneration committee members are likely 
therefore to be more engaged in and thoughtful about the process than randomly 
selected members. One further limitation of the study is the difficulty encountered in 
discriminating between an isomorphism in practice owing to mimetic behaviour as 
predicted by neo-institutional theory as opposed to the outcome of social learning 
(Westphal et al., 2001).  While the overwhelming number of responses pointed to a 
combination of regulative, normative and cognitive elements determining the 
observed isomorphic behaviour (Scott, 2001), there was one response (which was 
reported above) that clearly pointed to social learning.  Further work could usefully 
attempt to follow this up by greater probing in such cases as to the extent to which 
there was truly any effort to assess the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ associated with the 
initiatives of particular members of the peer group,  as distinct from overall corporate 
success.  
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 It would also be useful to introduce explicit neo-institutional constructs into 
the econometric modelling of CEO pay.  This can be done either by focusing around 
changes in the institutional environment (as in Main and Johnson (1993) or Conyon 
and Peck (1998) which examined the impact of the introduction of remuneration 
committees in the UK) or through cross-country comparative studies allowing that 
different local conditions can produce distinct institutionally embedded outcomes 
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Fiss and Zajac, 2003; Lounsbury, 2007).  To date, the 
comparative approach has been difficult owing to the varying extent of disclosure on 
executive pay, but this is becoming less of an issue with improvements in practice in 
many countries (Ferrarini and Moloney, 2005). 
 
The field study described above is based in the UK, but the implications of the 
importance of institutional influences would seem to apply to a wide range of settings 
and it would clearly be desirable to replicate this study, particularly in other countries 
with their own institutions. Pepper (2006) has contrasted the approach to executive 
pay in individualistic societies (such as the Netherlands, the UK or the USA) as being 
different from that in communitarian societies (such as France, Germany or Japan).  It 
is argued that in the former the agency theory view of pay as a motivator holds (in 
theory, if not in practice), while in the latter the emphasis is less on individual self 
interest and more on corporate social responsibility.  While this observation may be 
taken to suggest that the arguments presented above will be less applicable in some 
countries, there is an unmistakable movement in the European Union and elsewhere 
(Ferrarini and Moloney, 2005) towards greater transparency in directors’ 
remuneration, with more attention being paid to the structure and behaviour of 
remuneration committees.  This raises the possibility of a movement in expectations 
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towards something closer to a pay-for-performance perspective, particularly in the 
presence of increased cross listing of company shares (Oxelheim and Rondoy, 2005) 
although convergence in governance practice is far from uniform (Fiss and Zajac, 
2004; Collier and Zaman, 2005).   
The findings discussed above serve to highlight the importance of the neo-
institutional perspective and to caution against context-free applications of agency 
theory.  Those who even consciously set out to design performance contingent 
remuneration arrangements in the boardroom in an effort to realise the performance 
consequences of high commitment human resource management practices (Pfeffer, 
1998), would be advised to spend time considering the process by which such 
payment systems are designed and delivered.  As suggested by evidence from this and 
earlier studies (Spira and Bender, 2004; Perkins and Hendry, 2005; Ogden and 
Watson, 2006; and Lincoln et al., 2006), it seems clear that a neo-institutional 
perspective can highlight influences that result in remuneration arrangements 
remaining in practice some distance from what might be predicted by agency theory.   
 
In terms of policy recommendations, it would appear that in addition to a more 
circumspect attitude on the part of the remuneration committee, attention should be 
paid to resourcing the crucial role of remuneration committee chair.  An increased 
allocation of committee time (either in duration or frequency of meetings) seems to be 
merited if the technical aspects of calibrating the LTI with the key success factors of 
the company’s business strategy are to be addressed.  Greater attention is called for in 
examining the entire portfolio of unvested and vested-but-unexercised executive 
reward when determining the latest year’s award.  The discretion to fine tune the 
award package in the light of current circumstances will depend on a willingness to 
build such flexibility into the design of approved LTI schemes and an acceptance of 
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responsibility for such actions.  Similarly, in communicating with the ABI and other 
institutions, a more explicit readiness on the part of the remuneration committee to 
accept responsibility for the reward scheme set in place (and for its implementation) 
would improve effective communication. 
 From the interview evidence on UK remuneration committees discussed 
above, it seems that concerns with legitimacy pushes remuneration committees 
towards an institutional isomorphism in processes and practice.  Given that 
remuneration committees are no longer simply expected to guarantee the probity of 
the executive pay process but are now expected to design remuneration arrangements 
consistent with the successful strategic human resource management of the enterprise, 
an important consequence of this finding is that remuneration committee practice has 
not altered as much as might be desirable - owing to an overriding focus by 
remuneration committees on seeking legitimacy in the eyes of the shareholders and 
shareholder representative bodies. 
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Average Median Min Max
Remco members 3.9 4 2 6
Audit Co. members 3.7 4 3 5
Nom Co. members 4.6 5 2 8
Remco meetings per year 4.8 5 1 9
Audit Co. meetings per year 4.4 4 3 12
Nom Co. meetings per year 2.5 2 1 6
Length of Remco meeting (hours) 1.54 1.50 1.00 2.50
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics of Respondents’ Board Committees 
Table 1 
Membership and meetings data is taken from the remuneration reports of the 27 FTSE All 
Share companies on whose remuneration committees the respondents sat.  Length of meeting 
data is averaged over all respondents’ recollections.  
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Number of schemes
 using this metric
% schemes 
using this metric
profit 16 59%
earnings per share 9 33%
personal targets 8 30%
free cash flow 4 15%
sales 3 11%
return on capital employed 2 7%
other accounting metric 2 7%
customer satisfaction 2 7%
total shareholder return 2 7%
return on equity 1 4%
budget 1 4%
property price index 1 4%
net asset value per share 1 4%
costs 1 4%
debt reduction 1 4%
reportable injuries 
per thousand employees 1 4%
 
 
 
 
 
Number of schemes
 using this metric
% schemes
 using this metric
earnings per share growth 
at retail price index +x% 7 78%
relative total shareholder return 1 11%
other 1 11%
 
 
 
 
 
Number of schemes
 using this metric
% schemes
 using this metric
relative total shareholder return 19 90%
earnings per share growth 
at retail price index +x% 8 38%
cash flow 1 5%
return on invested capital 1 5%
net asset value per share 1 5%
profit 1 5%
other 1 5%
 
 
 
 
 
 
(i)  Performance metrics utilised 
 in annual bonus schemes 
(iii)  Performance metrics utilised in 
 performance share schemes 
(ii)  Performance metrics utilised 
 in share option schemes 
Table 2: Relative use of performance metrics across schemes 
Source: data from the Directors’ Remuneration Reports of the FTSE All Share 
companies on whose remuneration committees the respondents sat. 
 
N=9 schemes 
N=27 schemes 
N=21 schemes 
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Figure 1 
 
Stages of Analysis of the Remuneration Committee’s Activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business arrangements of 
the committee  
Communicating with 
stakeholders 
Calibrating the components of 
remuneration 
Review of remuneration 
outcomes 
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Representation of remuneration committee relationships 
